Likely access control hook on BNB Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x254da4a12520f34ea4eb93fd068da1fc8ef6c800 on BNB Chain · Access control

Volume (24h)
$36
Value locked (TVL)
<$0.01
All-time volume
$36
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
2 (2 traders)
Total swaps
2

What it does

Appears to restrict who may add liquidity to the pool using an admin-managed allowlist, with no visible swap or fee logic.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a check in beforeAddLiquidity that reads a mapping(address=>bool) from storage slot 1
  • Stores an admin address in slot 0 that can reassign the admin role
  • Exposes functions to set individual or batched allowlist entries
  • Exposes getters for the trusted position manager, pool manager and admin
  • Declares no swap, donate or fee-altering callbacks in its permission set
Swap behaviour
No swap callbacks.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity (0x259982e5) reads the mapping in slot 1, which suggests liquidity additions are gated by an allowlist. Other liquidity callbacks are present in the selector list but the permission flag set is only beforeAddLiquidity, so the remaining selectors are likely unused stubs or ABI-generated interface entries.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee.
Owner & admin controls
Admin address in slot 0 can transfer admin via transferAdmin(address) (0x75829def). A mapping(address=>bool) in slot 1 is toggled by 0x4e9ec38b(address,bool) and 0xe58ac296(address[],bool), which appear to whitelist addresses; the admin is likely the only writer, though this is inferred from selectors without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity

beforeAddLiquidity: gates liquidity additions, likely checking the allowlist mapping in slot 1 before the add proceeds.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The admin can change who is allowlisted and can reassign the admin role. A compromised admin key could permanently block all liquidity additions for non-whitelisted addresses or grant access to chosen addresses.

Risk to user funds: The hook does not appear to take tokens, use return deltas, or move pool funds. Its main effect is to block or allow liquidity additions, so users are exposed to being unable to add liquidity rather than to loss of funds.

Security findings

  • [medium] Single-step admin transfer: The admin address in slot 0 can reassign itself through transferAdmin with no visible timelock or two-step confirmation.
  • [medium] Admin-controlled liquidity access: Allowlist mutators (0x4e9ec38b, 0xe58ac296) are callable by the admin and change access to beforeAddLiquidity, so admin control determines who can provide liquidity.
  • [info] Unverified source: Decoded selectors show no pause or upgrade mechanism, but the source is unverified so this cannot be confirmed.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
4,354 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Likely access control hook