Likely custom pricing hook on BNB Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x440c3e3545ee24f660e470a5073353c480cbc888 on BNB Chain · Aggregator

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

An owner-upgradeable hook that intercepts swaps and appears to route them through an owner-configured target pool, with no confirmed extra fee. Traders pay that pool's fees, and LPs can always withdraw.

How it works step by step

  • Runs before each swap and can take over the swap amounts using a return delta, likely routing the trade through another pool (a second fee/tick-spacing/hook configuration stored in the hook).
  • Stores a target pool configuration (fee, tick spacing, hook address) that the owner can update.
  • Runs a check before liquidity is added, likely blocking or restricting direct LP deposits into this pool.
  • Is an upgradeable UUPS proxy controlled by an owner.
Swap behaviour
Before each swap the hook can replace or adjust the swap amounts via a return delta, apparently forwarding the trade to a configured target pool. Exact routing and any extra fee cannot be confirmed from bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
A check runs before adding liquidity and may restrict deposits. Remove-liquidity callbacks are disabled, so LPs can always withdraw.
Fee behaviour
No explicit hook fee was identified. Traders appear to pay the fees of the pool the trade is routed to, which the owner can change. Exact amounts cannot be verified from bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
The owner can upgrade the implementation at any time and can change the stored target pool fee, tick spacing, and hook address. No caps on these values could be verified.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeAddLiquidity: checks or restricts LP deposits; beforeSwap: intercepts swaps to route or handle them; beforeSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook change how much of each token the swapper pays or receives.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A single owner controls upgrades and routing settings. In the worst case an upgrade could take funds from swaps passing through the hook.

Risk to user funds: Swap input and output amounts can be modified by the hook through return deltas, with no verifiable cap. LP principal cannot be locked, because withdrawal callbacks are disabled.

Security findings

  • [high] Upgradeable proxy with swap return delta: The owner can swap in a new implementation, and because the beforeSwapReturnDelta permission is enabled, a new implementation could change swap amounts and take user swap tokens.
  • [medium] Owner-set routing target: The owner can change the target pool's fee, tick spacing, and hook address, which changes where and at what cost trades execute.
  • [info] LP withdrawals unrestricted: Remove-liquidity callbacks are disabled in the address, so LPs can always withdraw, even after an upgrade.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
100 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
Yes
Detected patterns
ownable, return-delta, upgradeable

Pools using Likely custom pricing hook