Likely access control hook on BNB Chain

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xff2253edc7adaa1f3d9c257096320cfe2a050800 on BNB Chain · Access control

Volume (24h)
$172
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$172
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
4 (2 traders)
Total swaps
4

What it does

An admin-controlled hook that gates adding liquidity to a pool and lets an authorized fee manager set the LP fee.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a check before every liquidity addition to the pool
  • Consults a whitelist mapping and a pool-initialized flag to decide whether the addition is allowed
  • Stores a pool key and LP fee that an authorized fee manager can update via setLPFee
  • Holds admin and fee manager roles that can be transferred or replaced
  • Exposes pool metadata getters such as getPoolKey and poolId
Swap behaviour
No swap callbacks.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity is enabled and appears to check a whitelist (mapping in slot 4) and a pool-initialized flag (slot 3) before allowing liquidity to be added, which suggests liquidity additions are gated to approved addresses or to an activated pool. Remove-liquidity hooks are present in the selectors but the permissions only enable beforeAddLiquidity.
Fee behaviour
setLPFee(uint24) lets an authorized fee manager set the LP fee stored in the pool key (slot 1 offset 20 / slot 6 offset 20) rather than a fixed fee; no fee-taking or fee-sharing logic is identified.
Owner & admin controls
Owner-style admin stored in slot 0 (transferAdmin, admin); a fee manager in slot 1 (setFeeManager, feeManager) can call setLPFee; a whitelist mapping in slot 4 is editable via 0x4e9ec38b and 0xe58ac296; activatePool sets pool state; a trusted position manager is referenced. Exact access checks cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeAddLiquidity

beforeAddLiquidity: gates adding liquidity, likely by checking a trusted position manager or whitelist and whether the pool is activated.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The admin and fee manager keys can change the LP fee and whitelist membership, and transfer admin rights; a compromised key could block liquidity provision for non-whitelisted users or set the fee to an unfavourable level.

Risk to user funds: The hook does not hold or move user tokens according to its enabled permissions, but it can refuse liquidity additions and alter the LP fee, which affects the economics for LPs and traders. No direct custody is identified.

Security findings

  • [info] Limited hook permissions: Only beforeAddLiquidity is enabled, so the hook cannot take or redirect token amounts directly through return deltas.
  • [medium] Admin-settable LP fee: The fee manager can call setLPFee, changing the fee applied to the pool; the allowed range and any caps are not visible in the decoded bytecode.
  • [medium] Admin-gated liquidity provision: A whitelist mapping and a pool-activation flag gate beforeAddLiquidity, so an admin can restrict who can add liquidity.
  • [low] Role transfer without evident timelock: Admin role can be transferred via transferAdmin and fee manager can be replaced via setFeeManager; no timelock is evident.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
7,870 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No

Pools using Likely access control hook