Hook 0x8a29…bfff on Ink

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x8a29b2c508007707bbff1814386aa968bbecbfff on Ink · Other

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$0
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
0

What it does

An upgradeable Uniswap v4 hook that appears to take a share of swap and liquidity flows and route fees to buyback, escrow and creator recipients, though its exact behaviour cannot be verified without source.

How it works step by step

  • Enables before and after callbacks for swaps with return deltas, so it can take a portion of swap amounts.
  • Enables liquidity add and remove callbacks with return deltas, so it can take tokens on liquidity changes.
  • References buyback vault, fee escrow and holder airdrop vault addresses, suggesting fees are routed to these destinations.
  • Contains dynamic fee, snipe tax and creator share error paths, suggesting configurable fee tiers and anti-sniping logic.
  • Operates as an upgradeable proxy, with the implementation at 0x243384225f8188a213bdef8523fab32ab5f0ea4e containing the logic.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap, afterSwap and their return-delta variants are enabled, so the hook can adjust swap amounts or take a fee on each swap; the precise fee and routing logic cannot be confirmed from the decoded bytecode.
Liquidity behaviour
afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta and afterRemoveLiquidityReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take or give back tokens on liquidity changes, and related selectors (holder airdrop epoch, deepen LPs) hint at liquidity side effects; exact behaviour is not determinable.
Fee behaviour
Bytecode references dynamic fee minimum, snipe tax, creator share, buyback and fee-route errors, suggesting fees are routed to buyback, escrow and creator recipients, but exact rates and split logic cannot be determined from the decoded input.
Owner & admin controls
Proxy with upgradeable implementation; the bytecode exposes admin-style selectors (setExcluded, _setPressRenderer, plugin, buybackVault, feeEscrow, hktHolderDropVault) and custom errors indicating configurable fee, buyback, airdrop and snipe-tax parameters, but the controlling role and upgrade authority cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, afterInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeDonate, afterDonate, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta, afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta, afterRemoveLiquidityReturnDelta

beforeInitialize, afterInitialize: pool setup checks. beforeAddLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterRemoveLiquidity: liquidity-side logic and return deltas. beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta: swap-time fee or delta capture. beforeDonate, afterDonate: donation hooks, purpose unclear. Return-delta flags let the hook take a cut of swap and liquidity amounts.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Upgradeable proxy implies the upgrade authority could replace the logic entirely, and privileged setters could redirect fees, buybacks or escrow funds to other addresses.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take a share of swap and liquidity deltas via return-delta permissions and holds or routes fees into escrow and buyback vaults, so user and pool funds are exposed to whatever logic the upgradeable implementation contains.

Security findings

  • [high] Upgradeable proxy: The hook is an upgradeable proxy, so its behaviour can be changed by whoever controls the upgrade authority.
  • [medium] Return-delta token capture: Return-delta permissions on swaps and liquidity changes let the hook take tokens from pool flows, which would be a source of user fund exposure if misused.
  • [medium] Privileged configuration setters: Bytecode contains setters for excluded addresses and renderer/plugin references, meaning privileged roles can alter routing and external dependencies.
  • [medium] Escrowed and buyback funds: Fee escrow and buyback vault references mean accumulated funds are held by the hook or linked contracts and depend on their admin controls.
  • [info] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the exact logic, rates and access checks could not be reviewed.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
18,422 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
Yes
Detected patterns
return-delta, upgradeable

Pools using Hook 0x8a29…bfff