Likely launchpad hook on Ink

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xa33c80507b82816f84cce80f2aa0f6d5cd5beac8 on Ink · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$70
All-time volume
$72
Pools using this hook
15
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
32

What it does

A launch-oriented Uniswap v4 hook that appears to manage a token launch with per-pool configuration, swap-level restrictions, and routing of swap-derived value into several vaults (floor, airdrop, holder airdrop, buyback, fee escrow).

How it works step by step

  • Stores a per-pool launch configuration and launch state keyed by pool id, set during pool initialization.
  • Enables beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks that read and update per-address last-swap records, consistent with anti-sandwich or per-wallet swap timing controls.
  • Uses beforeSwapReturnDelta, so the hook can alter the swap's net currency deltas and take value from swaps.
  • Tracks a pending auto-burn amount and a buyback notification path, suggesting value from swaps is partially burned or used for buybacks.
  • Exposes vault and distributor addresses (floor, airdrop, holder airdrop, buyback, fee escrow, revenue distributor), indicating fee or tax proceeds are split among them.
  • Contains internal crediting and exclusion functions and wallet-limit errors, suggesting per-wallet caps and exemptions for certain addresses.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are both active. beforeSwap can take currency via return deltas and can revert with swap-blocking errors; afterSwap records swap data, updates auto-burn and buyback accounting and may route value to vaults.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, afterAddLiquidity and afterRemoveLiquidity are present in the dispatch table; their exact logic cannot be determined from decoded bytecode alone, but they appear to gate or account for liquidity changes.
Fee behaviour
Swap-level value is redirected through return deltas and vault routing rather than a pure pool fee; the exact rate and split cannot be confirmed from bytecode and may be set through the configs mapping.
Owner & admin controls
owner() exists, and setOwner(address) and setFactory(address) are callable and write storage slot 0 and slot 1 without visible access-control inspection. A setExcluded(address,address,bool) function exists. Whether these are restricted to the owner cannot be confirmed from bytecode.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize and afterInitialize set up per-pool launch configuration. beforeAddLiquidity and beforeRemoveLiquidity likely gate liquidity actions. beforeSwap can take value and block swaps. afterSwap records activity and triggers accounting. beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook change swap deltas. beforeDonate and afterDonate are present in the dispatch table but are not enabled in the address permissions.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The owner can likely change privileged addresses and possibly the factory and vault routing, and may control exclusions and launch parameters, which could redirect or tax swap value and affect which wallets can trade.

Risk to user funds: The hook can take currency during swaps through return deltas, route value to several external vaults and distributors, and revert swaps, so it can hold or redirect swap-derived value and may block trades.

Security findings

  • [high] Unverified admin setters: setOwner and setFactory are nonpayable and write owner and factory storage. Without decoded access-control checks, the owner may be able to reassign control or change the factory, so the owner's ability to change privileged roles cannot be ruled out.
  • [medium] Hook takes value via return deltas: beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled and the bytecode moves currency through take and transfer paths, so the hook can extract value from swaps. The percentage taken depends on configuration that cannot be read from source.
  • [medium] Swap blocking: Error selectors such as SandwichBlocked and MaxWalletExceeded indicate that beforeSwap can revert trades, which may prevent users from exiting or trading if the rules are misconfigured or can be toggled.
  • [medium] Vault and distributor dependencies: Multiple external vault and distributor addresses are read from storage. If these are upgradeable or owner-set, redirecting fees to a different destination is possible.
  • [info] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so behaviour is inferred from selectors, storage layout and permissions and may be incomplete.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
15,693 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
donates, erc20, moves-currency, return-delta

Pools using Likely launchpad hook