Oracle hook on Base

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x4502b8e2332e2076945d33b1c561d3cd6a138040 on Base · Oracle

Volume (24h)
$59
Value locked (TVL)
$65
All-time volume
$38.67K
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
62 (49 traders)
Total swaps
17,232

What it does

This hook charges no extra fee; after swaps it may run owner-configured, flash-loan-funded arbitrage trades through the pool for the owner's profit, while traders pay the normal pool fee and LPs can withdraw freely.

How it works step by step

  • After each swap, the hook may trigger its own arbitrage-style trade when certain owner-set conditions are met.
  • It can take a flash loan from an owner-set source, swap through the Uniswap v4 pool, and sell tokens on an external venue to capture a price gap.
  • Profits from these trades build up in the hook, and the owner can withdraw them.
  • It does not take a fee from traders' swaps and does not touch LP deposits or withdrawals.
Swap behaviour
After a swap completes, the hook checks owner-set thresholds and may run its own follow-up trade against the pool, funded by a flash loan and an external sell route. It cannot change the amount a trader receives, because swap return deltas are disabled, but its follow-up trade can move the pool price after the trader's swap.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks; LPs can add and withdraw freely.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee. The hook charges no extra swap fee; its income comes from its own arbitrage trades, and the owner withdraws that profit.
Owner & admin controls
The owner can set the flash-loan source and the external sell venue, set two trigger parameters, update one more address (likely a price reference), withdraw accumulated profit, and transfer ownership. The exact parameter bounds cannot be confirmed from bytecode, though a BadParams error suggests some checks exist.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

afterSwap

afterSwap: after a user's swap, the hook can trigger its own flash-loan-funded trade through the pool and an external venue.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, medium confidence).

Who controls it: A single owner controls the external venues, the trigger parameters, and profit withdrawal. The worst case is that the owner breaks swaps by pointing the hook at venues that revert; the owner cannot touch LP principal.

Risk to user funds: The hook takes no fee from traders or LPs and can only move its own flash-loaned funds and accumulated profits. LP principal cannot be locked or drained.

Security findings

  • [medium] Owner-controlled external venues: The owner can repoint the flash-loan source and the sell venue that the hook calls during swaps. A faulty or malicious venue could make the post-swap trade revert, which would also revert the user's swap.
  • [low] Post-swap arbitrage trades: The hook may trade against the pool right after users swap, capturing price gaps that would otherwise go to outside arbitrageurs. It cannot change the output a user already received.
  • [info] LP withdrawals unrestricted: Remove-liquidity callbacks and return deltas are disabled, so LPs can always withdraw and no fee can be deducted from them.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
5,930 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, moves-currency, ownable

Pools using Oracle hook