Hook 0x6aa7…68c0 on Base

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x6aa73b10e4d8f4bcaa30820feb059115b2f068c0 on Base · Other

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$1.04
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
7 (3 traders)
Total swaps
7

What it does

A proxy-based Uniswap v4 hook that runs on pool initialization, liquidity additions and swaps, with referral-style deposit functions, though its exact behaviour cannot be confirmed without verified source.

How it works step by step

  • Runs a callback when a pool using the hook is initialized.
  • Runs a callback before liquidity is added, likely to gate or record deposits.
  • Runs a callback before each swap and another after each swap.
  • Exposes several deposit-style functions and a ReferredDeposit event, suggesting referral tracking.
  • Delegates all calls to an upgradeable implementation contract.
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap callbacks are enabled, so the hook runs around each swap; the exact adjustments or bookkeeping performed are not determined from the decoded input.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity is enabled and the hook exposes several deposit-like selectors (including a ReferredDeposit event), suggesting it gates or accounts for liquidity additions, but the exact logic cannot be confirmed without source.
Fee behaviour
Not determined from decoded selectors; no swap fee override or fee-taking logic was identified with confidence.
Owner & admin controls
Proxy pattern: the implementation behind 0xb4b7282a can be swapped by whoever controls the proxy admin or upgrade slot, which could change every hook behaviour. No owner, pause or fee setter selectors were decoded, so beyond the upgrade path no admin controls were identified.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap

beforeInitialize: runs when a pool using this hook is initialized. beforeAddLiquidity: runs before liquidity is added and may gate or record the deposit. beforeSwap: runs before each swap and may inspect or adjust it. afterSwap: runs after each swap, likely for accounting or bookkeeping.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The proxy implementation is replaceable, so a privileged upgrade key could change pool behaviour, block deposits or swaps, or redirect logic without users consenting.

Risk to user funds: The hook runs during initialization, liquidity addition and swaps, so if its implementation is changed or buggy it could affect pool operations and deposits. It is unclear from decoded bytecode whether it holds tokens directly.

Security findings

  • [medium] Upgradeable proxy: The hook is a proxy that delegates to a separately deployed implementation, so its behaviour can change after users interact with it.
  • [low] Unverified accounting state: Storage shows a nested address array and an address-to-uint256 mapping, which suggests per-address accounting or referral state; without source the exact effect on user balances is unclear.
  • [medium] Unverified source: No source is verified and the function names are mostly unknown, so the full behaviour and any admin paths cannot be audited from this input.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
24,448 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
Yes
Detected patterns
upgradeable

Pools using Hook 0x6aa7…68c0