Launchpad hook on Base

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xb20b00367e37f826a0652c85a6df375d784b20ec on Base · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$3.90K
Value locked (TVL)
$5.36
All-time volume
$3.90K
Pools using this hook
5
Swaps (24h)
42 (14 traders)
Total swaps
42

What it does

This is a launchpad-style hook that sets up each pool through its launcher and takes a per-swap fee via return deltas, but the exact fee rate and which trades pay more or less cannot be determined from the bytecode alone.

How it works step by step

  • Hook is initialised per pool through initializePool, storing per-pool configuration keyed by pool id, with a launcher address exposed by launcher()
  • Uses beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta, so it can alter the amounts settled on a swap, taking or providing tokens outside the pool's normal curve
  • Tracks fees per currency (totalFeesByCurrency) and cumulative fees per pool (cumulativeFees), and exposes the current fee per pool through currentFee
  • Writes swap-related accounting in storage on beforeSwap and afterSwap, updating per-currency balances and per-pool counters
  • Liquidity add and remove hooks and donate hooks are exposed as view-declared selectors, so they are present in the interface but do not appear to mutate state
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap are both active, and both can return deltas that change the swap settlement; they update fee and accounting storage on each swap. The exact fee split and which trade direction pays more or less cannot be determined from the decoded bytecode alone.
Liquidity behaviour
Liquidity add and remove hooks are present but declared view, so they appear to only read state and not change liquidity-related storage.
Fee behaviour
Fees are tracked per currency and per pool (totalFeesByCurrency, cumulativeFees, currentFee); the hook appears to take a fee from swaps and account for it, but the exact fee rate and recipient are not determinable from decoded bytecode.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found in the decoded interface; no owner or pause selectors were identified, though the launcher address may hold a privileged role that could not be verified from bytecode.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeDonate, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize and afterInitialize set up per-pool state at pool creation; beforeSwap and afterSwap update accounting and can adjust swap deltas; beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta allow the hook to take or give tokens as part of a swap; beforeDonate and afterDonate and the liquidity hooks are present but appear to be read-only.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: high, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: The launcher address appears to control pool setup, and any upgrade or key control over it could change how the hook settles swaps for all pools it serves.

Risk to user funds: Because the hook can return deltas on both before and after swap, it can hold, take or redirect swap value; trades routed through its pools are directly exposed to its accounting logic.

Security findings

  • [high] Return deltas on swaps: beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta are enabled, so the hook can take or provide tokens in every swap, which means its settlement logic directly affects user funds.
  • [medium] Unverified source: No verified source is available, so the exact fee, delta and launcher logic must be inferred from bytecode, which limits assurance about how funds move.
  • [medium] Launcher role: A launcher address is stored and exposed, and it likely governs pool initialisation; its privileges could not be verified from bytecode.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
11,471 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
launchpad, return-delta

Pools using Launchpad hook