Likely launchpad hook on Base

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0xf92ed5823e265ef2154c1fc673e625075b77a888 on Base · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$10.00B
All-time volume
$0
Pools using this hook
4
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
1

What it does

A Uniswap v4 hook that gates pool initialization and liquidity addition and intercepts swaps, apparently minting or managing a synthetic token for the pool, though its exact purpose is unclear without source.

How it works step by step

  • Validates or configures pool initialization in beforeInitialize
  • Checks liquidity additions in beforeAddLiquidity
  • Runs custom logic on each swap in beforeSwap and can alter swap deltas
  • Uses the pool manager unlock, take, settle and sync flow to move currency
  • Mints and burns a token (mint, burn, fakeToken lookup) tied to pools
  • Exposes an exit function for leaving the hook's position
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap runs custom logic on every swap and, via the enabled return delta, can take or supply currency so it participates in swap settlement.
Liquidity behaviour
beforeAddLiquidity is a view function that appears to gate liquidity additions; no liquidity removal callback is enabled.
Fee behaviour
Uses the pool's static fee; no fee logic identified in the decoded functions.
Owner & admin controls
No admin controls found.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize: validates or configures pool initialization for the pool key. beforeAddLiquidity: runs a check before liquidity is added, likely restricting who may add liquidity. beforeSwap: executes custom logic on each swap and can take or settle currency. beforeSwapReturnDelta: lets the hook return a delta that overrides part of the swap amounts, so it can absorb or supply tokens during swaps.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: Without source, the privileged role (if any) cannot be determined from the decoded functions; no owner or admin selector was identified.

Risk to user funds: Because beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled and the hook uses take, settle and unlock flows, the hook can hold and move currency during swaps; the exact conditions and whether it can block trades could not be determined without source.

Security findings

  • [high] Hook takes custody of swap currency: beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled and the bytecode contains take, settle, sync, clear, mint and burn selectors plus unlock and unlockCallback, so the hook can custody and move pool currency during swaps.
  • [medium] Synthetic token minting and redemption: The hook stores token-related mappings (fakeToken lookup, initialize, and per-pool address slots), suggesting it mints or redeems a synthetic or fake token tied to pools.
  • [medium] Public mint entry point with unclear access control: The mint(address,uint256) selector is payable and unauthenticated in the dispatch table; access control, if any, could not be confirmed without source.
  • [medium] Unverified exit function: An exit(address) function is exposed; its effect on user balances and pool funds cannot be verified from bytecode alone.
  • [info] Caller restriction present: An Unauthorized() custom error is present, indicating some caller restriction exists in the code.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,159 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, erc6909-claims, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Likely launchpad hook