Likely launchpad hook on HyperEVM

Uniswap v4 Hook Contract 0x93cf96e71e31b18245be19bef4f09edc64ec70c8 on HyperEVM · Launchpad

Volume (24h)
$0
Value locked (TVL)
$9.16
All-time volume
$1.65
Pools using this hook
1
Swaps (24h)
0 (0 traders)
Total swaps
4

What it does

A launchpad-style hook that manages launch-phase fees, a reserve floor, and operations fee sharing for a token pool, based on decoded selectors without verified source.

How it works step by step

  • Sets up pool state at initialization through beforeInitialize and afterInitialize
  • Applies launch-phase fee tiers and decay windows on swaps
  • Tracks reserves, a floor reserve and protocol liquidity
  • Accrues and pays an operations fee share
  • Supports pause, unpause and sunset controls by a guardian or owner address
  • Uses return deltas to take part of swap flows
Swap behaviour
beforeSwap and afterSwap run logic that adjusts fees, reserve accounting and swap deltas, with the return-delta permission allowing the hook to take a share of each swap.
Liquidity behaviour
No liquidity callbacks are enabled. Storage and selectors (protocolLiquidity, floorReserve, reserves, donateFloor) indicate the hook tracks reserves and a floor reserve, and it uses take and transfer calls to move tokens.
Fee behaviour
Selectors suggest fixed fee tiers (FEE_BPS, MID_FEE_BPS, LAUNCH_FEE_BPS, currentFeeBps) with decay windows (DECAY_SECS, PLATEAU_SECS) and an operations fee share (OPS_SHARE_BPS, totalOpsPaid, ownSwapFeesAccrued); exact fee logic is not verifiable from selectors alone.
Owner & admin controls
Owner-style controls via a stored address at slot 0 (setGuardian, renounce, pause/unpause, sunsetAll, heartbeat) and a launcher address at slot 3 (setLauncher); a floor-reserve address at slot 4 (setFloorReserve); a timelock getter exists. Exact permission checks cannot be confirmed without source.

Enabled Uniswap v4 callbacks

beforeInitialize, afterInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

beforeInitialize and afterInitialize set up the pool and launch state; beforeSwap and afterSwap run swap-time fee and reserve logic; beforeSwapReturnDelta lets the hook alter swap deltas and take a share of the swap.

Security & trust assessment

Risk level: medium, estimated (decoded bytecode, low confidence).

Who controls it: A privileged guardian and owner-like address can pause or unpause slots, change the launcher and floor-reserve addresses, trigger sunsetAll, and renounce control; a compromised key could disrupt pool operation or redirect the reserve.

Risk to user funds: The hook can hold reserve balances, take a share of swap deltas, transfer tokens, and be paused, so pool and user funds may be affected by admin actions or swap-time accounting.

Security findings

  • [medium] Privileged pause and sunset controls: Stored admin address at slot 0 can call setGuardian, pause, unpause, sunsetAll and renounce, so a single key controls pause and sunset behavior.
  • [medium] Hook takes a share of swap deltas: beforeSwapReturnDelta is enabled, so the hook can take tokens from swaps and the selectors indicate reserve and loan accounting, which adds custody and accounting risk.
  • [medium] External token movement via changeable addresses: The contract makes external token transfers and take calls, and launcher and floor-reserve addresses can be changed by admin functions, so token flow depends on those addresses.
  • [info] Unverified source: Source is not verified, so behavior is inferred from selectors and storage only.

Contract details

Verified source
No
Bytecode size
21,770 bytes
Upgradeable proxy
No
Detected patterns
erc20, moves-currency, return-delta, self-unlock

Pools using Likely launchpad hook